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  1. forum rang 5 The Third Way... 21 augustus 2013 23:24
    Laten we niet vergeten dat Deutsche 1 v/d eersten was die de regels doorbrak en indertijd niet "callde". Mooie jongens, die Duitsers. En dan is het nu wat makkelijker beslissen over je al bezoedelde reputatie in de markt...

    Overigens, zou de toezichthouder dat callen van Deutsche wel toejuichen?

  2. [verwijderd] 22 augustus 2013 00:20
  3. DirkDeNeu 22 augustus 2013 09:41
    quote:

    Stapelaar schreef op 21 augustus 2013 17:11:

    Zou een lepe move zijn om vervolgens een inkoopbod uit te brengen. Overigens zie ik de koers niet bewegen op dit bericht, vind ik vreemd.
    De reden dat ie nauwelijks bewoog, is omdat de verwachting was dat deze niet gecalled werd. Kan in December nog een keer. Zoals vaak zijn de houders van deze perps wel op de hoogte.
  4. [verwijderd] 23 augustus 2013 09:52
    quote:

    benito c. schreef op 22 augustus 2013 15:42:

    Dus via Interactive Brokers handelen in obligaties.
    Dat kan nu ook al. IB vraagt € 5,-- per maand als fee en dan kun je handelen in Europese obligaties. Helaas wel heel selectief. Waar die selectie is op gebaseerd, weet ik niet. Ik vermoed op de rating die de obligatie heeft meegekregen.
  5. forum rang 5 devil80 23 augustus 2013 23:20
    quote:

    fred holm schreef op 23 augustus 2013 09:52:

    [...]

    Dat kan nu ook al. IB vraagt € 5,-- per maand als fee en dan kun je handelen in Europese obligaties. Helaas wel heel selectief. Waar die selectie is op gebaseerd, weet ik niet. Ik vermoed op de rating die de obligatie heeft meegekregen.
    dit is correct,ik heb heel veel van de perps en andere financials oblies uit dit forum niet kunnen vinden als verhandelbaar (hun antwoord is dat ze niet te clearen zijn; wat volgens mij rare reden is)
    heb veel bonds geprobeerd met A ratings en lagere ratings niets was beschikbaar.

  6. forum rang 5 The Third Way... 28 augustus 2013 23:35
    FT.com vandaag

    Cocos: Ingenuity that’s proving too good to be true

    By John Dizard

    An awe inspiring level of ingenuity is being concentrated by capital markets experts on perfecting a product line of financial perpetual motion machines. If you’re a fixed income person you’ve heard of them before: bank-issued contingent convertible debt instruments, or “cocos”, which are intended to give investors the reliable coupon of a bond and issuers the balance sheet and income flexibility of equity.

    Depending on the perceived creditworthiness of the issuing bank, they will have coupons ranging from 7 per cent to 9 or even 10 per cent. That is higher than long-term bank debt, but much lower than today’s implied equity returns.

    Oh, and regulators and governments have the comfort that any future bank bailouts are paid for by the private sector, not the taxpayer. I used the term “perpetual” without irony; these are perpetual instruments, which cannot be called back by the issuer if rates go down. They would pay the coupons until regulator-determined “going concern” capital dips below some trigger percentage of assets, which may be as low as 5.125 per cent or even as high as 8 per cent. The concept is to turn debt into equity to forestall an event of default if excessive losses on the asset base are incurred. It goes without saying that lawyers and capital markets teams get their end of the deal up front. They’re not waiting for perpetuity. I spent a lot of time over the past several months staring at documentation and analyses of cocos before it finally dawned on me how they violated the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which is usually the problem with perpetual motion machines. Step back from the complex structure of coupons, conversion triggers, tax opinions, etc, and ask yourself the question: who is going to pay the revenue needed to support this expensive paper?

    Right now, in the European bank capital markets, there are about €20bn of “Tier One” cocos outstanding. The capital markets people are projecting that over the next three to five years there will be up to €400bn of cocos floating around the continent. Given general price inflation below 2 per cent and falling, added to real growth of maybe 1 or 2 per cent in the good years, how will there be enough nominal GDP to support these coupons? Keep in mind that eurozone banks have assets of about three times GDP. Where will the banks’ customers get the income in ready money to pay for this increasingly equity-financed bank lending or securities buying?

    European bank capital markets people are well aware of the internal contradictions created by simultaneous demands by the authorities for higher capital ratios, more lending to finance economic growth, lower losses, and lower incentive compensation for the banker-alchemists who are supposed to do all this. Cocos are a regulator-and-government-driven attempt to square the circle and reconcile the unreconcilable. Someone has to lose money here with the consequent career damage. The euro-level authorities and national governments don’t intend to have future writedowns come out of their tax revenues or borrowing base. The bankers know that, if the coco perpetual coupon-paying instruments are turned into loss-bearing equity, they will not have, technically, failed. The player at the table who doesn’t know how the cards are marked has to be the institutional investor who buys the cocos.

    That would be European pension funds or insurance companies, which need higher returns than are now on offer in European markets if they are to pay the benefits promised to policy holders or pensioners. The complexity of the coco documentation, and the effective impossibility of accurately assessing the probability of a forced conversion into equity, make it easier for management to ignore the real risks. Their confusion is a feature, not a bug.

    One of the closest recent analogies to coco paper was the $5bn in preferred stock Goldman Sachs sold to Warren Buffett just after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway received a 10 per cent coupon and five-year warrants giving the right to buy Goldman stock at a distress-sale price. Goldman redeemed the shares for a 10 per cent premium in 2011, and redeemed the warrants this year by effectively giving Buffett over $1.5bn worth of stock without his having to put up any cash. Hey, it was a crisis, and they were consenting adults.

    But cocos are being priced at high rates, in perpetuity, to underpin not one highly profitable firm, but most of the European banking system. It’s just too good to be true.

  7. Stapelaar 29 augustus 2013 18:26
    quote:

    shaai schreef op 29 augustus 2013 17:22:

    Wederom behalve voor de houder? Met zijn dan lage coupons?
    In dat geval wel met zijn relatief lager wordende coupons, maar het blijft natuurlijk de vraag hoe we uit de crisis gaan komen, met een sluipscenario of een plofscenario.
    Sluipscenario: overheveling van waarde van crediteuren naar debiteuren door middel van beperkte inflatie gecombineerd met negatieve reele rente zoals nu plaatsvindt.
    Plofscenario: steeds verder oplopende rentestanden leiden uiteindelijk tot massale schulddoorhalingen (Japan is hier een sterke kandidaat).
  8. forum rang 5 The Third Way... 2 september 2013 22:09
    FT.com vandaag

    Banks face new set of capital rules

    Banks face being hit with a new set of international capital rules aimed at forcing bondholders rather than taxpayers to bail out failing institutions.

    Global regulators are seeking support from world leaders to draw up proposals to force banks to hold a minimum amount of debt that can be “bailed in” if a bank collapses.

    Mark Carney, the Bank of England governor who is heading global efforts to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis, said the move was a necessary component in the “ambitious” desire of the Group of 20 nations to stop the most important banks from being “too big to fail”.

    As chairman of the Financial Stability Board, Mr Carney was seeking to win political backing for regulators to draw up more concrete plans at this week’s G20 summit in Russia.

    But even with agreement, he said that the process of protecting countries from “too big to fail” banks would still take a long time and could not be completed until 2015 at the earliest.

    “We now have to move from powers to practical?.?.?.?We have made a promising start but we have to translate it into actual resolution plans [for individual global banks]”, he said.

    To ensure failed banks did not need to be bailed out by taxpayers, those which are deemed to be globally important banks are likely to be asked to ensure their capital structures offer taxpayers sufficient protection with high levels of potential loss absorption.

    Bob Penn, a partner at Allen & Overy, said: “Banks will welcome a global standard for loss-absorbing capacity, as it will promote a level playing field.”

    Individual banks may also be forced to make substantial organisational changes, while regulators will probably have to sign unprecedented co-operation agreements in which they promise to respect each other’s decisions about inflicting losses on shareholders and creditors.

    Both the US and EU have made progress towards a legal framework that would make it possible to shut down or break up a failing cross-border bank, Mr Carney said. But he added that they were a long way from being ready to deal with an actual problem.

    He also warned individual countries not to become so attached to their own local solutions. “We need to guard against division, national structures that could impede the integration of international markets,” he said.

    The EU, the UK and the US are all working on different schemes to protect their local economies from failing global banks, including the ringfencing of retail banking in the UK and local capital requirements for branches of overseas banks in the US.

    The “bail-in-able” debt requirement would come on top of the core tier one capital that banks already have to hold as part of Basel III global reforms. Switzerland already requires something similar but a global rule would be new for most global banks.

    “The question is whether you need a substantially consistent global minimum,” said Mr Carney, who heads the global regulatory body, the Financial Stability Board. “After absorbing [a bank’s losses], is there sufficient bail-in-able debt to relaunch?”
  9. Stapelaar 3 september 2013 18:28
    Toch eigenlijk wel logisch want het uitsluitend verhogen van de tier 1 maatstaf lost niet zoveel op.
    Immers, in geval van plotselinge grote (te verwachten) verliezen kan de vereiste tier 1 neerwaarts worden doorbroken en moet een centrale bank overtuigd worden dat het weer snel wordt opgelost, zeg binnen 12 maanden. Dit was zo bij een lage tier 1 maatstaf en daar verandert niets aan bij een hoge tier 1 maatstaf. Ook in dat geval zal een of andere Dijsselbloem roepen dat de bank failliet zou zijn in geval van gedwongen liquidatie.
    Er moet dus wel een tussenvorm komen die een plotseling tier 1 tekort kan repareren. Het steeds verder verhogen van alleen de tier 1 maatstaf geeft wel meer zekerheid voor de senior schuldeisers, maar dus niet voor de huidige achtergestelde leningverstrekkers en de aandeelhouders.
  10. forum rang 5 The Third Way... 26 september 2013 08:40
    Wie riep dat onze hybrids minder interessant worden... :-)

    Obligatiebelegger Pimco heeft het Pimco GIS Capital Securities Fund gelanceerd. Dit is een fonds dat zich richt op wereldwijde beleggingen in achtergestelde leningen uitgegeven door banken, verzekeraars en andere financiële instellingen.

    Het fonds wordt beheerd door Philippe Bodereau, managing director en hoofd onderzoek naar financials op PIMCO’s kantoor in Londen.

    Hij beheert sinds 2011 de managed account-versie van de strategie.
    Het fonds speelt in op de verscherpte regulering van de financiële sector als gevolg waarvan de kapitaalbuffers verbeteren. Dit zou tot minder bankfaillissementen moeten leiden, aldus Bodereau.

    Het fonds is toegevoegd aan Pimco's in Dublin gevestigde ucits-fondsenreeks. Deze bevat nu 47 fondsen, die in totaal ruim 130 miljard euro bevatten.
  11. forum rang 4 shaai 26 september 2013 12:19
    Wie riep dat onze hybrids minder interessant worden... :-)

    je bedoelt dat alle juice eruit is als de grafiek zover al is opgelopen, dat het marketingtechnisch interessant wordt om er een plaatje (ehh: fonds) van te verkopen? Om eventueel het ALLERlaatste beetje juice eruit te persen? *cynisch-modus af* ;-)
  12. Stapelaar 9 oktober 2013 17:15
    Ik lees zojuist een aardig marktcommentaar in de september nieuwsbrief van Boussard&Gavaudan:

    In Financials, new hybrid structures have been picking up (for example, Societe Generale, Credit Agricole) and the pipeline is growing. This segment should dominate the primary market in the coming months. Indeed, Basel 3/CRDIV rules regarding new compliant instruments (additional Tier 1 Cocos, T2s) were finalised in June.

    With the amortisation of old hybrid structures starting in January 2014, banks are expected to be active in issuing new hybrid instruments. This is not only to re-balance their capital structure between CT1 and senior debt (1.5% bucket of AT1s cocos and 2% Tier 2s under Basel 3), but also as a way of addressing further regulatory and rating agencies
    constraints, i.e. shifting the focus from Core Tier 1 to total Capital (for example, AT1s count in leverage ratio calculations in most jurisdictions; T2s high trigger Cocos structures count as S&P capital).
  13. forum rang 4 shaai 12 november 2013 15:12
    nl2 VPRO Slag om Europa
    www.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/...
    op 17:40-17:50 Dijsselbloem: (bijna letterlijke transcript)
    ' Banken aanpakken, als je dat doet: pijnlijk op korte termijn, want er komt veel ellende boven, er moet misschien geld bij, er moeten beleggers worden aangeslagen voor de rekening, dat is niet pijnloos'
    ....
  14. fwb 20 november 2013 09:56
    ING 8%, KBC 8% perpetuals:

    By Charles Daly
    Nov. 6 (Bloomberg) -- The European Commission decision to
    allow ING (A3/A/A) to call its USD 8.5% Tier 1 hybrid in Dec.
    raises questions on how ING and other banks may manage their
    existing capital call schedules, analysts say.
    • Morgan Stanley
    • Jackie Ineke writes that doubt is now cast on assumption that ING wouldn’t call its EUR 8% T1s before April 2015 (call ban is to earlier of Nov. 2014 or when state aid is repaid)
    • Expects EC to approve call if ING raises further Tier 2 capital to replace 8% T1
    • Continues to recommend bond given YTC (April 2014) is 1.5%
    • Also cites greater caution on KBC’s EUR 8% T1s, with YTC (May 2014) of 0.9%
    • MUSI
    • Eva Olsson writes that it’s unclear if ING’s announced strategy to call bonds on an economic basis will apply after the call ban is lifted in Nov. 2014
    • ING USD 3-month $Libor +360bps T1s may qualify as AT1 and hence most likely to be left outstanding on economic grounds
    • ABN could also follow suit; cites EUR 4.31% T1s as potentially remaining outstanding after first call date
    • Mizuho
    • Roger Francis says decision to allow ING to call its T1 suggests that where advantages of a call are skewed towards the bank vs bondholders the EC has no objections, even in state-aid cases
    • Could see more exchanges going into year-end
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